In July 2022, UN Secretary General António Guterres warned the world about the growing set of challenges climate change poses to the Caribbean—describing the region as “ground zero” for the climate emergency. Despite having a minuscule carbon footprint compared to large industrialized nations, Caribbean countries—like most small island developing states (SIDS)—are disproportionately impacted by climate change. These climate change impacts include the increasing intensity of extreme weather events like tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides. These extreme events represent major humanitarian and economic challenges for the Caribbean. To respond to these challenges, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) has led regional efforts to prepare for growing climactic dangers and has built an impressive network of regional institutions. However, many Caribbean countries still remain far behind the curve. Thus, national governments, regional institutions, and the region’s partners must build upon existing advancements to ensure the wide adoption of resilience measures and protection of all communities.

Tropical cyclones or hurricanes historically represent the most dramatic and devastating extreme weather phenomenon in the region. Hurricanes have caused 18,000 deaths and over $163 billion in damages since 1950. Worryingly, scientists like Global Americans Working Group Member Kevin Reed, have highlighted how climate change makes hurricanes more powerful and destructive than in previous decades. In 2017, the losses and damages associated with Category 5 Hurricane Maria cost the island nation of Dominica approximately 226 percent of the country’s 2016 GDP. Unfortunately, as the impacts of climate change worsen, what happened to Dominica is likely to happen again. Emerging data suggest that the percentage of storms that reach Categories 4 or 5 will continue to increase. Such predictions have led the Inter-American Development Bank to estimate that by 2050 annual losses related to extreme weather events will cost the region $22 billion—a figure representing 10 percent of the current regional economy.  

To ensure their continued economic and social survival, Caribbean countries have no option but to take effective action to build resilience. In recent years, several governments have intensified their efforts to anticipate, absorb, and recover from the effects of extreme weather events. To date, most Caribbean countries have designed national strategies to bolster resilience. International and regional organizations and partners have also increased their cooperation with these nations to improve emergency preparedness and response. However—as in much of the developing world—these efforts remain insufficient and highly unequal. Luckily, the region has built an important network of institutions to implement international mechanisms and set a common regional policy that serves countries and territories to respond to the extreme impacts of climate change. 

To anticipate, accommodate, and recover from natural disasters, CARICOM and its member states have established institutions such as the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH), the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). In addition, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Central America and Dominican Republic Center for Coordination and Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC, per its Spanish acronym) are advancing climate resilience throughout the Caribbean basin. For their part, international organizations—such as the United Nations—as well as international partners—like the United States and the European Union—are also playing an important role in helping these organizations by providing resources to fund projects aimed at enhancing climate resilience across the region. Despite these initiatives and the significant progress made at the regional level, there are still multiple challenges to be addressed. According to the 2023 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration—signed at the VIII Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americans and the Caribbean (RP23)—current investment in disaster risk reduction is insufficient to address existing needs. The Declaration also warned of significant challenges associated with the implantation, monitoring, and reporting of the targets set by the Sendai Framework. 

Despite these efforts and various multilateral agreements urging developed countries to cut global greenhouse emissions and provide financial and logistical assistance to SIDS, the extent of the region’s challenges remain unclear at best and existential at worst. In addition, the lack of a supranational institution responsible for implementing climate regulation has left nation-states as the main actors responsible for taking climate action. 

Given the Caribbean region’s diverse set of political, economic, and social realities, it is important to look at a variety of countries and contexts to identify best practices for resilience building. Understanding the challenges the governments of Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Dominica, and Barbados face in building climate resilience allows for tailored policy recommendations as well as identifiable regional trends. These countries and territories not only represent some of the most climate-affected in the world but also have different levels of economic development, corruption, government effectiveness, as well as political leadership. These are important factors that better position nations to build resilience than those that lack these governance-related characteristics.

On the national level, governments should also look to promote resilience building and disaster risk reduction measures as central components in infrastructure-project planning, implementation, operation, and maintenance. In doing so, they must use a multidisciplinary approach to disaster risk governance and management that includes hard and soft sciences. Both perspectives are indispensable to a comprehensive understanding of the needs and concerns of diverse, impacted communities. At the regional level, Caricom must enhance capacity building through the existing network of regional institutions such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), and the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH).

On the extra-regional level, multilateral institutions and the region’s partners must coordinate their efforts to build resilience subject to the needs as defined by the recipient countries. Resilience-boosting efforts, whether from organizations like the UN or partners like the U.S., must aim to strengthen the capacities of the local and national institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction and promote the transfer of information, knowledge, and technology on voluntary and mutually-agreed upon terms. Crucially, multilateral development banks need to expand concessional loads to upper-middle and high-income SIDS regardless of country-specific income classifications. In all collaborative cases, partners should implement frameworks with the understanding that the nature of the Caribbean’s climate challenge necessitates funding and timelines that recognize the dire threats therein.     

With or without climate change, extreme weather events will exist and regrettably affect people in the Caribbean and worldwide. However, as global average temperatures warm, the Caribbean stands out as particularly vulnerable to the catastrophic, compounding effects of climate change in the form of extreme weather events. Contending with tropical cyclones, droughts, heat waves, and heavy rains require practical solutions which will invariably touch upon politically sensitive issues—ranging from questioning the rationale of the current international financial architecture, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems such as corruption and government mismanagement. Given this reality, there is a pressing need to strengthen international and regional mechanisms, as well as improve national and regional governance to bolster climate resilience.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impact of climate change on extreme weather events in the Caribbean, read Global Americans’ full report, “Extreme Weather Events and Resilience in the Caribbean.”

Jackson Mihm is an Associate Editor at Global Americans and the Project Lead for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

The post June Marks the Beginning of Atlantic Hurricane Season—So, How Can the Caribbean Bolster its Resilience? appeared first on Global Americans.

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Apuntar a las oportunidades de crecimiento verde en América Latina y el Caribe podría ser una forma para que la administración Biden amplíe su agenda nacional de acción climática para incluir objetivos de política exterior más amplios. A pocos días de la Cumbre del Clima de la ONU (COP 26) en Glasgow, el debate en Washington sobre la infraestructura y la reconciliación presupuestaria tendrá implicaciones globales, especialmente en lo que respecta a la crisis climática.

Las negociaciones actuales dentro del Partido Demócrata sobre el tamaño del gasto propuesto probablemente requerirán que la Casa Blanca posponga algunas propuestas de políticas relacionadas con el clima, incluidos los esfuerzos para descarbonizar el sector eléctrico. Sin embargo, la geopolítica de la energía todavía debe sufrir un cambio radical del status quo actual. Un informe reciente del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente indicó que los gobiernos planean producir alrededor de un 110 por ciento más de combustibles fósiles para 2030 de lo que sería consistente con limitar el calentamiento a 1.5°C. Incómodos con estos hallazgos, funcionarios gubernamentales de Australia, Japón, Arabia Saudita y otros países presionaron a las Naciones Unidas para que minimizara sus mensajes sobre los recortes necesarios a los combustibles fósiles.

Los líderes mundiales de todo el espectro político han expresado su apoyo a los ambiciosos objetivos climáticos. Pero los países del G20 han dirigido aproximadamente 300.000 millones de dólares hacia actividades de combustibles fósiles desde el comienzo de la pandemia -más que el nivel de financiación que se ha dirigido al sector de la energía limpia. Esto no es “reconstruir mejor.” Si esta tendencia continúa, pone a Estados Unidos y sus vecinos hemisféricos en una trayectoria precaria, amenazando potencialmente la estabilidad regional en el futuro. Además, pone en peligro importantes esfuerzos multilaterales, debilitando la agenda de transición energética, incluidos los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible para la energía, y amenazando la arquitectura general de la COP que los países han desarrollado desde 1995. ¿Cómo puede cambiar el status quo entonces? Una gran parte de la solución se basa en abordar la influencia política y económica de los intereses de los combustibles fósiles en todo el mundo, que, en los Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, gastan más que lo que se gasta en la promoción de las energías renovables en una proporción de 13 a 1.

Quedan otras preguntas críticas. En primer lugar, ¿puede la política interior y exterior de EE.UU. promover de manera más efectiva el desarrollo de la energía renovable en los Estados Unidos y en la región, ayudando a revitalizar las exportaciones manufactureras de Estados Unidos y generar buenos empleos remunerados? En segundo lugar, ¿podría tal énfasis en las exportaciones estadounidenses ayudar a cerrar la división partidista y cambiar el cálculo político hacia un consenso sobre la transición energética en Washington? Por último, si los Estados Unidos desean superar seriamente a China en el hemisferio occidental como una forma de rivalidad económica, ¿pueden las asociaciones tecnológicas y científicas en energía renovable con aliados clave en América Latina ayudar a ampliar las relaciones económicas, impulsando así una transición energética global que sea más rápida y rentable? Estas son preguntas importantes a considerar ya que los países del Hemisferio Occidental son de los socios económicos más cruciales para los Estados Unidos y viceversa.

Del mismo modo, los países de la región también se enfrentan a continuos desafíos, si no crisis, desde la salud pública y el estado de derecho hasta la erosión de la confianza en las instituciones democráticas. La crisis climática de muchas maneras ha sido capaz de unir a diversos grupos y coaliciones políticas en toda la región. Por ejemplo, la reciente cumbre climática latinoamericana organizada por Argentina, junto con Chile, Costa Rica y Colombia, y a la que asistió el enviado especial presidencial de Estados Unidos para el Clima, John Kerry.

Si bien puede no parecer evidente ahora, los líderes latinoamericanos que buscan una relación económica y comercial más sólida con los Estados Unidos pronto podrían encontrar que la transición energética se ha convertido en una prioridad para la administración Biden. Funcionarios estadounidenses se han reunido con líderes en Colombia, Ecuador y Panamá, en un aparente intento de proyectos financiados por Estados Unidos por contrarrestar la Iniciativa de la Ruta de la Seda de China. Los países de las Américas pueden beneficiarse del renovado compromiso de Estados Unidos para aumentar las exportaciones de tecnología de energía limpia a la región, y también pueden desarrollar importantes asociaciones en manufactura. La escala de las inversiones necesarias es grande y la ambición por nuevos proyectos de energía e infraestructura es impresionante.

El proyecto Horizonte en el norte de Chile es un ejemplo. Desarrollado por la firma energética chilena Colbún, se proyecta que este parque eólico de 778 megavatios esté operativo en 2024. Con 140 aerogeneradores y 850 millones de dólares en inversión privada, es el proyecto de energía eólica terrestre más grande de América Latina. Mientras tanto, en la vecina Argentina, el proyecto solar Cauchari, el más grande de América Latina, recibió el 85 por ciento de su financiamiento del Banco de Importación y Exportación de China, con la condición de que el 80 por ciento de los materiales se obtuvieran de proveedores chinos. Si se hubiera ofrecido en términos similares, los argentinos no habrían rechazado el financiamiento de fuentes estadounidenses o europeas. En pocas palabras, los financistas de China vieron una oportunidad económica que otros no vieron y la tomaron.

Más allá de las oportunidades de mercado para las empresas estadounidenses, ambos partidos políticos también deben reconocer las prioridades cambiantes para la seguridad internacional y las amenazas globales que existen en el horizonte. El último informe de Tendencias Globales de las agencias de inteligencia de EE.UU. destacó que el cambio climático probablemente se intensificará junto con los cambios demográficos, lo que resultará en nuevas vulnerabilidades en los países en desarrollo y empeorará “los riesgos existentes para la prosperidad económica, los alimentos, el agua, la salud y la seguridad energética”. Más recientemente, el Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia publicó un nuevo informe sobre las tendencias de seguridad para las próximas dos décadas, indicando que los efectos físicos del cambio climático “aumentarán el potencial de inestabilidad y posiblemente conflictos internos” en las naciones en desarrollo, las que son más propensas que los países desarrollados a sentir los impactos del cambio climático. Por lo tanto, las cadenas de suministro regionales sostenibles no solo promueven la prosperidad en América Latina y ofrecen beneficios al sector de energía renovable de los Estados Unidos, sino que también benefician los intereses de los Estados Unidos en materias de seguridad nacional.

Los mercados regionales de América Latina y el Caribe pueden estimular una mayor inversión y ampliar el desarrollo de las energías renovables en los Estados Unidos, pero sólo si los líderes reconsideran como se desarrollan sus relaciones comerciales existentes. Las relaciones comerciales modernas no deben depender simplemente de productos básicos, como el cobre, el litio, el cobalto, el níquel y los minerales de tierras raras. Además de desarrollar estos recursos, una asociación equitativa también se debe basar en la innovación científica y el descubrimiento, lo que puede llevar al florecimiento y construcción de alianzas sólidas y sostenibles a largo plazo. El desarrollo de baterías mejores y más eficientes, la evaluación y expansión a gran escala de la industrial de energía de concentración solar, e incluso el logro de economías de escala que viabilicen comercialmente la industria de hidrógeno verde, son áreas en las que varias naciones latinoamericanas desean avanzar.

La política comercial de Estados Unidos puede establecer las nuevas reglas del juego para un planeta que está en calentamiento, mediante la incorporación de mejores estándares laborales y ambientales en los mercados extranjeros. Al mismo tiempo, puede beneficiar a los Estados Unidos al incorporar la diplomacia comercial, científica, tecnológica, y proyectar su influencia en las relaciones comerciales bilaterales y regionales.

Hasta ahora, Estados Unidos ha dejado esta oportunidad sobre la mesa para las naciones europeas, como Alemania, España e Italia, que tienen crecientes intereses comerciales en el sector de la energía limpia, así como para las empresas estatales chinas, que a menudo buscan solo la obtención de rentas y el control sobre los recursos naturales. Pero no siempre ha sido así en los EE.UU. Entre 2010 a 2014, el gobierno de Obama lanzó la Iniciativa Nacional de Exportación, que buscaba duplicar las exportaciones de Estados Unidos durante un período de cinco años. Un aspecto clave de la política incluía un enfoque en la exportación de energía renovable y tecnologías de eficiencia energética a mercados clave. El gobierno de los Estados Unidos identificó a varios países latinoamericanos con oportunidades de mercado significativas y como socios potenciales para las empresas estadounidenses.

Del mismo modo, la administración Biden ha propuesto la creación de una Iniciativa de Exportación de Energía Limpia e Inversión Climática para “ofrecer incentivos a las empresas estadounidenses que suministran soluciones bajas en carbono al mercado internacional con el fin de estimular la industria, los empleos y la competitividad de los Estados Unidos, y hacer de Estados Unidos el líder mundial en tecnologías de energía limpia”. Este tipo de propuesta de política se alinearía con la meta regional en el hemisferio de alcanzar el 70 por ciento del uso de energía renovable para 2030, que ya cuenta con el apoyo y respaldo de Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, los Estados Unidos debe desempeñar un papel más activo en el apoyo a este objetivo más allá de simplemente promover sus exportaciones. Debe contar con un programa de promoción de las exportaciones con mayores inversiones en investigación y desarrollo con países claves en la región. Lo que es más importante, los líderes estadounidenses deben desalentar el uso de combustibles fósiles. Aquí, la administración Biden tiene poder ejecutivo para iniciar el importante trabajo requerido para reformar y cambiar la política interior y exterior de los Estados Unidos, y con ella, influir en el status quo de los mercados energéticos en el exterior. Sin embargo, también el Congreso debe actuar e ir más allá de los intereses electorales de corto plazo.

Durante la COP 26 y hacia adelante, la administración Biden debería ir aún más allá en áreas donde tiene la capacidad de hacerlo, sin las limitaciones de la dinámica política intrapartidista y donde puede lograr el mayor impacto en el corto plazo. Considerando un marco de políticas más ambicioso en su aplicación de “contratos de colaboración y suministro con proveedores aprobados” para los objetivos de mitigación del cambio climático en el extranjero, la administración Biden puede apoyar los objetivos de energía renovable y el desarrollo sostenible en el Hemisferio Occidental comenzando por abordar los desafíos de reforma de los subsidios a los combustibles fósiles, tanto dentro del país como en América Latina.

Limitar la inversión respaldada por Estados Unidos para proyectos contaminantes en petróleo y gas es muy importante para evitar nuevos activos que rápidamente serán desplazados esta década. Esto también debe ir acompañado de compromisos mayores con objetivos de transición energética renovable de la región. Al abordar el papel de las inversiones respaldadas por Estados Unidos en la industria de los combustibles fósiles, en las principales economías extractivas como Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Ecuador y México, el rol de las principales instituciones de financiamiento para el desarrollo de estados Unidos, como la Corporación Financiera Internacional para el Desarrollo, el Banco de Exportación e Importación de Estados Unidos y la Agencia de Comercio y Desarrollo, deben encaminarse hacia una nueva estrategia donde se vinculen los intereses de seguridad nacional, cambio climático y oportunidad económica de Estados Unidos con el logro de beneficios compartido con todo el hemisferio.

Si el progreso en EE.UU. es difícil obtener, un mayor énfasis y conexión con las economías de América Latina y el Caribe puede comenzar a crear cadenas de suministro más resistentes, promover la inversión y el comercio transfronterizos y promover aún más los beneficios de la transición energética no solo para el pueblo estadounidense, sino también para aquellos elegidos para servir a sus intereses.

Ricardo Raineri es ex ministro de energía de Chile, asesor principal de AUI, Inc., y profesor de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Anders Beal es asociado en el Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Los puntos de vista y opiniones expresados son los de los autores.

The post La crisis climática: ¿una oportunidad compartida para el liderazgo de Estados Unidos y América Latina? appeared first on Global Americans.

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Targeting green growth opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean could be one way for the Biden administration to expand its domestic climate action agenda to include broader foreign policy goals. With only days remaining until the U.N. Climate Summit (COP 26) in Glasgow, the debate in Washington over infrastructure and budget reconciliation will have global implications, especially as it concerns the climate crisis.

Current negotiations within the Democratic Party over the size of proposed spending will likely require the White House to table some climate-related policy proposals, including efforts to decarbonize the electricity sector. Yet the geopolitics of energy must still undergo a radical departure from the current status quo. A recent report by the United Nations Environment Programme indicated that governments plan to produce around 110 percent more fossil fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Uncomfortable with these findings, government officials from Australia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries lobbied the United Nations to downplay its messaging on cuts to fossil fuels.

Global leaders across the political spectrum have voiced support for ambitious climate goals. But G20 countries have directed approximately $300 billion toward fossil fuel activities since the beginning of the pandemic—more than the level of funding that has gone towards the clean energy sector. This is not “building back better.” If this trend continues, it puts the United States and its hemispheric neighbors on a precarious trajectory, potentially threatening regional stability in the future. Furthermore, it puts important multilateral efforts in jeopardy, weakening the energy transition agenda, including the Sustainable Development Goals for energy, and threatening the overall COP architecture that countries have developed since 1995. How can the status quo change then? A large part of the solution rests in tackling the political and economic influence of fossil fuel interests worldwide—which, in the United States for example, outspend renewable energy advocacy by a ratio of 13 to 1.

Other critical questions remain. First, can U.S. domestic and foreign policy more effectively promote renewable energy development in the United States and in the region—helping to revitalize U.S. manufacturing exports and generate good-paying jobs? Second, could such an emphasis on U.S. exports help bridge the partisan divide and shift the political calculus toward a consensus on the energy transition in Washington? Lastly, if the United States wishes to seriously outcompete China in the Western Hemisphere as a form of economic rivalry, can technological and scientific partnerships in renewable energy with key allies in Latin America help broaden the economic relationship, thereby advancing a more rapid and cost-effective global energy transition? These are important questions to consider since the countries of the Western Hemisphere are some of the most crucial economic partners for the United States and vice versa.

Similarly, countries in the region are also facing continued challenges, if not crises—from public health and the rule of law to eroding trust in democratic institutions. But the climate crisis in many ways has been able to unite diverse groups and political coalitions across the region. Take for example the recent Latin American climate summit hosted by Argentina, alongside Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia, and attended by U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry.

While it may not appear evident now, Latin American leaders seeking a more robust economic and commercial relationship with the United States could soon find that the energy transition has become a priority for the Biden administration. U.S. officials have met with leaders in Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama—in an apparent bid to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative with U.S.-funded projects. Countries throughout the Americas can benefit from renewed U.S. commitments to increase clean energy technology exports to the region, and they can develop important partnerships for manufacturing as well. The scale of investment needed is large and the ambition for new energy projects and infrastructure is impressive.

The Horizonte project in northern Chile is one example. Developed by Chilean energy firm Colbún, this 778-megawatt wind farm is projected to be operational in 2024. With 140 wind turbines and $850 million dollars in private investment, it represents Latin America’s largest onshore wind energy project. Meanwhile, in neighboring Argentina, the Cauchari solar project, the largest in Latin America, received 85 percent of its financing from the Import-Export Bank of China, on the condition that 80 percent of materials would be sourced from Chinese suppliers. If it had been offered on similar terms, Argentines would not have turned down financing from U.S. or European sources. Put simply, Chinese funders saw an economic opportunity that others did not and took it.

Beyond the market opportunities for U.S. firms, both political parties must also recognize the shifting priorities for international security and the global threats that exist on the horizon. The latest Global Trends report by the U.S. intelligence community highlighted environmental change as likely to intensify along with demographic shifts, resulting in new vulnerabilities in developing countries and worsening “existing risks to economic prosperity, food, water, health, and energy security.” Most recently, the National Intelligence Council released a new report on security trends for the next two decades, indicating that the physical effects of climate change “will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict” in developing nations, which are more likely than developed countries to feel the impacts of climate change. Therefore, sustainable, regional supply chains not only promote prosperity in Latin America and offer benefits to the U.S. renewable energy sector, but also benefit U.S. national security interests.

Regional markets in Latin America and the Caribbean can stimulate greater investment and scale up renewable energy development in the United States—but only if leaders rethink their existing trade relationships. Modern trade relationships should not simply rely on commodities, such as copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth minerals. In addition to developing these resources, an equal partnership based on scientific innovation and discovery can also flourish and build strong and sustainable long-term alliances. Developing better, more efficient batteries, examining industrial scale deployments of concentrated solar energy, and even advancing economies of scale within the green hydrogen industry could all be areas for exploration for several Latin American nations.

U.S. trade policy can establish new rules of the game for a warming planet by incorporating better labor and environmental standards in foreign markets. At the same time, it can benefit the U.S. by incorporating commercial, scientific, and technological diplomacy and projecting soft power into bilateral and regional trade relationships.

So far, the U.S. has left this opportunity on the table for European nations, such as Germany, Spain, and Italy, which have growing commercial interests in the clean energy sector, as well as Chinese-state owned enterprises, which often seek rents and control over natural resources. But in the U.S. this hasn’t always been the case. From 2010 to 2014, the Obama administration launched the National Export Initiative, which sought to double U.S. exports over a five-year period. A key aspect of the policy included a focus on exporting renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies into key markets. The U.S. government identified several Latin American countries as significant market opportunities and potential partners for U.S. companies.

Similarly, the Biden administration has proposed the creation of a Clean Energy Export and Climate Investment Initiative to “offer incentives for U.S. firms that supply low-carbon solutions to the international market in order to spur U.S. industry, jobs, and competitiveness, and make America the world leader in clean energy technologies.” This type of policy proposal would align with the regional target in the hemisphere to reach 70 percent of renewable energy use by 2030, which already has U.S. support and backing. But the United States cannot play a more active role in supporting this target simply by promoting its exports. It must accompany an export promotion program with greater investments in research and development in partnership with countries in the region. Most importantly, U.S. leaders must discourage the use of fossil fuels. Here, the Biden administration has executive powers to initiate the important work required to reform and change U.S. domestic and foreign policy, and with it, influence the status quo of energy markets abroad. However, Congress must also act and go beyond short-term electoral interests.

During COP 26 and beyond, the Biden administration should go further in areas where it has the ability to do so, without the constraints of intra-party political dynamics and where it can realize the greatest impact in the short term. By considering a more ambitious policy framework in its “all-of-government” approach to climate mitigation abroad, the Biden administration can support renewable energy targets and sustainable development in the Western Hemisphere by beginning to address fossil fuel subsidy reforms at home and within Latin America.

Limiting U.S.-backed investment for polluting projects in oil and gas is incredibly important to avoid stranded assets this decade. But it must also be accompanied by greater commitments to the region’s renewable energy transition. By addressing the role of U.S.-backed investments in the fossil fuel industry—in major extractive economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico—primary institutions of U.S. development finance such as the International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the Trade and Development Agency—can all be part of a new strategy that links U.S. national security interests, climate change, and economic opportunity for the shared benefit of the entire hemisphere.

If progress at home is difficult, a greater emphasis and connection to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean can begin to create more resilient supply chains, promote cross-border investment and trade, and further sell the benefits of the energy transition not just to the American people, but also to those elected to serve their interests.

Ricardo Raineri is a former Chilean minister of energy, senior advisor to AUI, Inc., and a professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Anders Beal is an associate in the Latin American Program for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors.

The post The Climate Crisis: A Shared Opportunity for U.S. and Latin American Leadership? appeared first on Global Americans.

Note: This piece originally appeared in Project Syndicate, an organization that produces and delivers original, high-quality commentaries to a global audience.

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WASHINGTON, DC – Relations between the United States and much of Latin America are recovering after hitting rock bottom under former U.S. President Donald Trump. But while President Joe Biden’s administration is focusing on the Central American migration crisis, it must not miss the opportunity to drive urgently needed climate action to help the region rebuild after the pandemic.

Given the scale of Latin America’s economic collapse in 2020—its 7.4 percent GDP contraction was the worst of any region—most of its national leaders did not dwell much on climate change. Argentina, Mexico, and Peru have yet to direct a single dollar of recovery spending toward reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions and air pollution, according to the Oxford University Economic Recovery Project. Instead, vast sums have gone to the region’s fossil-fuel industries.

Today, as Latin America inches toward recovery, it is vital that the region’s governments align their rebuilding strategies with their commitments under the 2015 Paris climate agreement. The U.S. could help make that happen.

To limit global warming this century to below 1.5 degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels, Latin American countries, along with the rest of the world, must halve GHG emissions by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. While this is a tall order, we have most of the necessary technology. The region’s ample renewable energy sources, together with electrification of transport, could largely replace reliance on fossil fuels, which accounted for most of Latin America’s GHG emissions in 2018. Such a transition would reduce air pollution and attract the investment needed to help reverse a surge in joblessness and poverty over the past year.

Latin America’s renewables sector is already growing rapidly, and accelerating the green transition would drive economic recovery. Economists say that by 2030, the region could attract USD $432 billion in renewable-energy investments, excluding hydropower, and thus save billions on oil and gas imports and health-care spending related to dirty air.

But aligning Latin America’s energy sector with the Paris climate agreement’s goals will be difficult without U.S. support. Private and state-owned energy companies committed to oil and gas production remain influential, as the large share of stimulus spending allocated to them in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico makes clear. By contrast, tight national budgets include little money for electric buses or charging stations to encourage widespread electric-vehicle adoption.

By emphasizing renewable energy in Latin America, the U.S. could dramatically alter the region’s energy posture. And regional leaders recognize that cooperation on climate change is a good way to strengthen ties with Biden’s administration. Presidents Alberto Fernández of Argentina and Iván Duque of Colombia, and Chilean environment minister Carolina Schmidt, have already spoken with Biden’s climate envoy, John Kerry.

Unlike in the U.S., climate change is not a partisan issue in Latin America, where polls show that 90 percent of citizens regard it as a serious threat. The 2019 United Nations climate change conference, COP25, took place under the auspices of the Chilean government, and several countries from the region met the December 2020 deadline to update their emissions-reduction pledges under the Paris agreement.

Biden’s April 22-23 Leaders’ Summit on Climate will be an opportunity to highlight the climate policies of Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica. At the same time, Biden can nudge the region’s biggest GHG emitters, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, to do more to align their recovery plans with the Paris goals and avoid further fossil-fuel bailouts.

Biden could also use the summit to articulate how the U.S. will phase out both domestic fossil-fuel subsidies and its financing of fossil-fuel production abroad. In recognition of the social and economic costs of this transition, he could offer a range of incentives to invest in renewables, including a significant increase in renewables funding from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). These investments would complement similar lending by the Inter-American Development Bank.

By boosting renewable energy in Latin America, the U.S. could expand its participation in one of the world’s most dynamic sectors. The DFC currently ranks fifth in renewable energy financing in Latin America, behind Spain’s Banco Santander and the German development bank KfW. Italy’s Enel, the United Kingdom’s Actis, and Brazil’s Omega are the biggest wind and solar operators in the region, with the U.S.-based AES in seventh place. China is the region’s dominant supplier of solar technology, and the two biggest suppliers of wind turbines are European, far ahead of third-place General Electric.

The Biden administration recognizes this opportunity. In executive orders, Biden has identified the fight against climate change as an essential component of U.S. foreign policy and national security, and pledged international collaboration to drive capital toward clean energy and away from fossil fuels, particularly in developing countries.

For Latin America, there is no time to lose. So far, Biden’s regional policy has been understandably dominated by the chaos at the U.S. border with Mexico—a crisis that originates in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The U.S. must now broaden its approach to this critical region, and capitalize on the goodwill that Biden has built up there during his career. Encouragingly, two senior U.S. administration officials recently visited South America with climate and environmental issues reportedly among the key topics of discussion.

Without the support of leading allies like the U.S., Latin America will struggle to advance a clean energy transition, especially if it focuses on propping up its oil and gas industries in an attempt to rebound from the pandemic. Alternatively, U.S. incentives and diplomatic engagement could accelerate a green transformation that offers both Latin America and the U.S. enormous social and economic opportunities.

Guy Edwards, a former senior consultant at the Inter-American Development Bank and former co-director of the Climate and Development Lab at Brown University, is co-author of A Fragmented Continent: Latin America and the Global Politics of Climate Change.

Benjamin N. Gedan, a former South America director on the U.S. National Security Council, is Deputy Director of the Wilson Center’s Latin American Program and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University.

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Latin American cities are one of the most unequal places in the world, to the extent that the image of favelas next to luxurious residential towers in Brazil has become the textbook definition of inequality. With 90 percent of Latin Americans predicted to live in cities by 2050, it is necessary to plan these urban spaces to equitably accommodate citizens for the inevitable future. How cities decide to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic is imperative for the future of Latin American cities and will impact generations to come.  

The French philosopher Henri Lefebvre introduced the idea of “the right to the city,” in which he argued that every citizen should be included in shaping the urban environment. The production of space should not be driven by property owners’ needs but by the people who inhabit the space. Unfortunately, this is not reality. In a market-centric society, this “right” is reserved for a small privileged group. 

When property is valued more than human life, it instigates inequality, resulting in the marginalized displaced to peripheries and forced into hazardous living conditions. COVID-19 has revealed this by showing the two tales of the Latin American city: the excluded and the included. In this case, the excluded live in the periphery and lack access to necessities such as public transportation, clean water, healthcare, among other things. In comparison, the included can enjoy the security and comfort of their homes while isolated from others. When planning for the post-COVID-19 city, the focus should not just be on preparing for the next pandemic, but also addressing societal issues that have been ignored for far too long. 

Reclaiming the city

To mitigate the spread of the coronavirus, mayors, and urban planners adapted cities to facilitate social distancing; and consequently, designed cities to serve humans. For instance, in Bogotá, Colombia, the government replaced 35km of traffic lanes with new emergency bike lanes to ease crowding in public transport. In addition, the Colombian capital closed 117km of streets to cars to encourage citizens to walk and cycle during the lockdown. This not only happened in Bogotá but also in Mexico City, Mexico—which introduced a similar bike lane expansion project. 

Mexico City has made it a goal to build up to 131 km of bike lanes as a safer travel option during the pandemic for those who depend on public transportation. Cycling should be encouraged in cities as it not only helps to adhere to social distancing orders but offers many other benefits, such as promoting citizens’ health. On top of that, pedestrianizing streets and expanding sidewalks allows urban dwellers to reclaim the streets that were once dominated by cars. These projects allow cities to transform in a fashion that ensures pedestrians and cyclists are given center stage to navigate its streets.

Instead of having these interventions span until the end of the pandemic, why not keep them for the long-term? As cities slowly open up, Latin America has the unique opportunity to resume without the same levels of congestion. It is a fact that Latin American cities are some of the most congested in the world. In Bogotá, drivers lose up to 191 hours a year stuck in traffic, making the Colombian capital the most congested city in the world. The lack of adequate public transportation in the past has contributed to the widespread use of motor vehicles in Latin American cities that we see today. Due to this, it has generated immense mobility challenges and also aggravated class divisions. 

For example, in São Paulo, mass transit accounts for 58 percent of all commuting trips in the city and is mostly completed by low-income workers. Even though public transportation ridership has decreased in the city due to fear of contagion, this essential infrastructure should be revised to accommodate and encourage citizen usage. Fortunately, São Paulo has recognized this reality and increased bus fleets in some lines to avoid crowds and increased the frequency of their sanitization protocols in both stations and vehicles. Such a case highlights the possibility of investing in public transportation infrastructure and shows how important it is to promote sustainable and equitable growth.

Making city cycling safer, creating pedestrianized streets, and expanding public transportation, are demands that have been made by urban dwellers for years. Even before the coronavirus reached Latin America, urban citizens have long demanded stronger plans to tackle climate change.

During the lockdown, cities worldwide—including in Latin America—saw a drastic drop in carbon dioxide emissions. By seizing this moment, cities can reduce emissions in the long-term by further encouraging walking, cycling, and public transportation usage. This is vital for Latin American cities as many suffer from high levels of pollution—around 25 years ago, Mexico City was considered the most polluted city in the world. COVID-19 lockdowns are demonstrating that a future with fewer cars on the road—and therefore reduced carbon dioxide emissions—is not impossible. By planning the cities around pedestrians instead of motor vehicles, we can promote a more sustainable way of living. 

A push for equitable cities

Nevertheless, it is crucial to keep in mind for whom these urban interventions are catered for. Even though these projects aim to make cities sustainable, climate change movements have perpetually excluded marginalized populations. It is vital to note where these projects are taking place and whether they contribute to the exclusion of Afro and Indigenous communities in Latin America. In many cases, public transportation has been an instigator for gentrification, resulting in higher rates of displacement of lower-income citizens. Careful examination of the implementation of these projects is needed to ensure that they will be accessible to all in the long-term.

To advocate for the “right to the city,” it is essential to make sure that all citizens have the “right” and means to shape their post-COVID-19 communities. This can be realized by allowing social participation in the administration of the city. Those who will be most affected by these mobility projects should be in the room voicing their concerns and needs to prioritize the social, rather than commercial, function of urban space. The COVID-19 pandemic can be a force to instigate change in Latin America. Only if we facilitate social participation will we have the opportunity to build post-COVID-19 cities for a more equitable future. 

Giulia Andronico De Morais Salles is an Urban Studies undergraduate student at The New School in New York. 

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