The Western Hemisphere is at an important inflection point. The Americas were the hardest hit region globally by the COVID-19 pandemic—both economically and in terms of cases and deaths—and the region continues to struggle in its recovery. At the same time, the region faces the ever-growing threat of climate change, persistent inequality, the destructive middle-income trap, growing disillusionment with democracy, the largest refugee crisis outside of a war zone, among numerous other challenges. Given the veritable cornucopia of threats the region faces, identifying which challenges are the most pressing and challenging is a difficult task—but a necessary one if governments across the region are to address these threats.

The Top Challenges Facing the Americas According to Global Americans’ International Advisory Council

Fortunately, Global Americans benefits from the insights of its International Advisory Council (IAC)—a diverse group of the foremost experts on hemispheric affairs from across the Americas and a variety of different professional backgrounds. When asked what they see as the greatest regional challenges, our IAC provided an impressive list of topics ranging from concerns over democratic backsliding in the region to disinformation to the implications of growing animosity between the United States and China for the region. Despite our Advisory Council’s mixed opinions on the chief threat the region faces, there were several areas of consensus on some of the greatest challenges. These included:

1. Limited Institutional Capacity

Governments across the region—both democratically-elected and those with authoritarian tendencies—are facing trouble in delivering services and on their promises to their populaces as well as even ensuring security in different parts of their countries. While several different elements lead to a lack of institutional credibility, Stephanie Junger-Moat noted that “A lack of institutional integrity is to blame for widespread lack of institutional checks and balances—this has created an environment throughout the region where political corruption is left unchecked, the rule of law is questionable and economic and social advancement are impeded. If the region cannot do better in strengthening its institutions it will be unable to embrace the needed economic, political, and social reforms necessary to promote growth and prosperity.”

The limits of government capacity in these spaces create potentially volatile situations that impact the economies of countries across the region and have political implications that can further erode future state capacity. This “limited capacity of the State to enforce its own legality creates much space for illegal activities, corruption, areas of society totally excluded from the formal functioning of institutions, and even for the emergence of populist leaders,” highlighted Flavio Dario Espinal. As one member noted, week institutions are exacerbated by other challenges facing the region, such as drug trafficking and crime. This incentives politicians in the region to develop strong institutions that lack oversight to address specific challenges—as Nayib Bukele has done in El Salvador. While this may address a specific problem, it does little to address the gaps in institutional capacity of the state and may create longer term challenges. Therefore, in order to address many of the region’s challenges, governments must first take the important step of strengthening their institutional capacity.

2. Populism and Democratic Backsliding

As Espinal underscored, the limited capacity of the state can result in the rise of populist leaders. Global Americans IAC members were deeply concerned about the rise of populist leaders—from across the political spectrum—and democratic backsliding occurring across the region. Espinal noted that in the region, “the authoritarian tradition manifests itself in different forms… and styles…” In addition to the lack of state capacity in delivering to the needs of its citizens, Espinal suggested “the dissolution or pulverization of political parties in many of our societies… [and] the fragmentation of political life, the difficulties of establishing an effective relationship between State and society, and, ultimately, the creation of conditions for the emergence of populist leaders that operate in a political vacuum.”

Populist leaders and the political vacuum surrounding them can create further challenges for the democratic functioning of a country. Indeed, Jorge Mariscal stressed, “The growing prevalence of policies that reject independent institutions and checks and balances, as well as an effort to turn back the clock on globalization, undermine democracies and polarize society.” Polarized societies further ideas of governance as a zero-sum game and limit the desire of governments to implement the governance reforms necessary to establish the institutions that can deliver to the people. This vicious cycle leads to the continuing deterioration of democracy.

IAC Charmain Tulio Vera warned that “…populism leads to unrealistic economic expectations, which can only be remotely met by fiscal expansion. The latter typically proves to be the Achille’s heel of an economy, and leads to negative economic performance from which the population at large suffers in terms of growth, opportunity, and inequality.” Indeed, Mariscal also cautioned, this deterioration and populist policies “do not result in the best allocation of national resources, so growth and income distribution… suffer.”

3. Lack of a 21^st-Century Development Strategy

As democracies decline and populist governments fund expanding budgets, the region finds itself in a new economic situation. One very different from where the regional economy was in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, when, as Tulio Vera reminded, “market-oriented policies brought greater predictability to economic policy, faster growth performance, and reduced income and wealth inequality. Furthermore, globalization made adherence to such policies easier, and the benefits were quicker to achieve.”

However, governments in the region have shifted their reference, including the United States. Javier Corrales highlighted that regional development “…has been extractivist, with no real strategy to develop competitiveness.” This model has led governments to utilize natural resource windfalls to boost spending and stimulate the local economies, something which cannot be sustained when commodity prices decline. As Vera emphasized, this “stop and start aspect of policy implementation in the region makes it difficult to develop the solid economic foundations that not only build reliable economic partnerships, but which facilitate the establishment of local political institutions.”

Past economic growth and populist spending have created a volatile situation that exacerbates democratic decline and institutional decay while also creating new problems. This sentiment was expressed by Richard Feinberg, who said that “Citizens anticipate rising household incomes which over time requires sustainable economic growth that is reasonably well shared among social classes… [However, when not reached,] frustrations produce a wide range of serious problems; [including] emigration, narcotics addictions, and crime—which in turn can corrode support for national institutions and open the gates to opportunistic authoritarian leaders.”

4. Educational Limitations

Limited and unequal access to education in much of the hemisphere exacerbates these challenges. Even though there were important improvements in educational attainment across the region during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the COVID-19 pandemic erased these gains and will continue to have long-lasting implications for educational attainment in the region as students may not return to school.

Low levels of educational attainment and education quality result in a self-perpetuating cycle that limits growth opportunities for the region as a whole. Indeed, as Jacqueline Bern de Mena informed, “…Because of the lack of quality education, people have less access to improve their income and quality of life, thus creating greater economic inequality, and in turn greater political instability.” This political instability should not come as a surprise, after all, as Richard Feinberg affirmed, because “education provides a baseline context for analyzing life’s challenges and opportunities, and for critically assessing information.”

Not only do limits to educational attainment perpetuate the other challenges the region faces, but limited educational opportunities and outcomes will result in even greater impacts further down the line. As Junger-Moat advised, the region “… needs to create societies that are better educated and able to be more competitive in today’s global workforce.” This shift will require that governments begin the necessary investments in education now as “high quality education is required to train the workforce of the future in an increasingly sophisticated technological society,” as Feinberg indicated.

5. The Lack of a Clearly Defined U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean

Although many of the problems discussed above are based on domestic challenges, according to many members of our IAC, waning U.S. interest has only allowed the challenges in the region to grow. As Enrique Garcia stated “Evidence shows the diminished priority given by the U.S. to Latin America and the Caribbean in view of the higher importance given to other areas of the world,” including Russia and China.

The neglect of the region, however, comes at a cost. U.S. leadership can play a profound role in the region. As Vera mentioned, “The United States has often acted as a leader and a role model—this has been expressed through its policies and initiatives towards the region. While the reception has not always been positive, and the intentions have not always been altruistic, the leadership and guidance that the United Sates has exerted has created a more predictable policy anchor for the region. Without this guidance, policy in the region seems adrift.”

The lack of coherence includes trade and integration, which the United States has long been a proponent of. Instead, as Amparo Mercader warned, “U.S. policies have become self-centered and no longer aim to foster trade and integration with the region.” Although the United States is prioritizing its competition with China, the United States still has not focused on promoting trade with Latin America and the Caribbean despite China’s growing trade with the region.

With the United States focused on other regions, as Garcia warns, we are also seeing the “…fragmentation of the LAC regional and sub-regional integration mechanisms.” The lack of regional cooperation combined with reduced U.S. leadership create a void that contributes to the inability of the Americas to address the shared challenges and to take advantage of opportunities on the horizon.

While the challenges the region faces are numerous, our International Advisory Council views those laid out in this paper as the greatest tests facing the Americas as a whole. Addressing these challenges will require a gargantuan effort and prioritizing these specific areas over other issues that become the issues du jour. Fortunately, many of these areas are interconnected. Getting these fundamental challenges in check can allow stakeholders to address some of the other challenges our IAC identified and that continue to evolve.

The Global Americans International Advisory Council (IAC) is a standing body of leading economists, political scientists, journalists, diplomats, and thought leaders in the Americas. Learn more about this group of world-class thinkers here.

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Medical advancements have made it so that acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is no longer a death sentence. However, those affected by the disease still face stigma and discrimination. In the pursuit of acceptance and equality, Argentine civil society organizations have taken it upon themselves to reshape the meaning of public health. While we often think of public health from a medical standpoint, social factors—including ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, and socioeconomic background—are critical to how individuals experience public health challenges. Narrow interpretations that only focus on medical issues limit the ability of governments and changemakers to respond to health crises. This is why health must also be regarded as a social problem. By adopting this perspective, societies can better understand the obstacles that stand in the way of greater equality and design effective policies to create a more just world. Following Argentina’s civil society push for social justice and to voice the concerns of marginalized communities, the country’s government took important steps that focus on social matters in its response to AIDS.

As is the case for any serious health challenge, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) demands a comprehensive array of medical-related services. From diagnosis to treatment, public health is key in providing accessible care for those exposed to the virus. Furthermore, research demonstrates that factors like gender identity and socioeconomic background can greatly influence susceptibility to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including HIV/AIDS. Transgender individuals, queer people, and sex workers are particularly vulnerable to these health risks. That is why it is crucial to place the needs of these individuals and their specific communities at the center of the discussion. By recognizing that social inequalities have a greater impact on these groups, governments and NGOs can develop targeted interventions designed to meet their specific needs. 

Role of Civil Society Organizations

Globally, the LGBTQ+ rights movement advocates ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. One of the ways in which this prejudice is present is in unequal access to health. Community-led organizations are working to solve this challenge. In Argentina, civil society organizations have been the protagonists in the fight for LGBTQ+ rights for a while. Through persistent activism, demands for access to equal marriage, a gender identity law, and anti-discrimination safeguards are now a reality in the country. Undoubtedly, Argentina’s latest take on social matters regarding HIV is no different. It is impossible to understand its content without recognizing the voices of these organizations.

From raising awareness with the general public to drafting a law proposal focused on comprehensively addressing HIV, NGOs have always been present in Argentina’s fight for equality. The importance of these organizations lies in their ability to amplify the testimonies of stigmatized communities and offer solutions to government officials. Mechanisms such as dialogue tables and knowledge transfers between activists, social groups, and government authorities effectively achieve a more comprehensive perspective. This kind of collaboration directly provides policymakers with insights and perspectives from those most affected. Their testimonies serve as invaluable assets for creating powerful responses.

For example, in 2017, the health commission in the Argentine Congress ruled in favor of a national law for the integral response to HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. Still, due to a lack of political support, it didn’t make it past the rest of the legislative process. Activist groups protested this decision and mobilized before Congress, demanding political commitment. Following the demonstrations, government officials and activists set up a dialogue table. From there on, the parties arranged to follow up to finalize the project’s content.

Improved Regulations

Argentina’s latest response to HIV/AIDS is a clear example of a longstanding problem being addressed with a broader understanding of health in mind. Last June, Argentina’s Congress approved Law 27675, updating regulations enacted over thirty years ago. The new legal framework creates tools and mechanisms to reverse the socioeconomic disparities that affect marginalized communities while reinforcing the preexisting focus on providing medicine, testing, and treatment.

Argentina’s new law provides guidelines to build interdisciplinary and intersectoral responses, guaranteeing human rights in health, labor, and civil rights. The new legal framework establishes testing and the provision of adequate treatment for HIV as a national interest. It also commits to financing research and the development of new forms of treatment. These commitments certify that medical care is guaranteed, setting the foundations for addressing the other sides of the issue. 

In addition to committing to improving medical outcomes, the law takes a novel approach and incorporates elements that aim to support the welfare of Argentines living with HIV. One way this is done is by implementing new labor rights. These new rights help marginalized groups by prohibiting diagnostic tests for HIV, viral hepatitis, and other STIs during pre-employment medical exams and during the relationship with an employer. Education institutions, public or private, are also banned from demanding mandatory diagnostic tests for members of their community. This proposal tackles diagnoses used as a weapon for workplace and school discrimination.

Additionally, Law 27675 creates a non-contributory retirement plan for people with HIV or Hepatitis B/C. Due to discrimination, people living with HIV have difficulties accessing formal employment and, therefore, cannot meet the criteria to access pension plans. In this case, a progressive pension scheme where low-income people with HIV and Hepatitis B/C contribute less than those with a higher income to gain a similar pension is an effective way to achieve greater economic inclusion.

A Path Forward for the Rest of the Region

Committing to testing, treatment, and support is a core element of addressing HIV/AIDS as a health challenge. What happens at the doctor’s office is crucial, but real commitment needs to go further than that. Through resilient activism, Argentina’s civil society achieved tangible changes in the country’s health paradigm, introducing regulations focused on providing access to healthcare while reducing marginalization. Political leaders from across the Americas can learn from Argentina’s experience and prioritize community-led strategies as key tools in their national responses to address this challenge. People are calling for a broader understanding of health. It is time policymakers listen.

Please find more information here for additional resources on HIV and other STDs.

Francisco Gulielmetti is an intern at Global Americans. He currently studies International Studies at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Follow Francisco on Twitter @fran_guliel.

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Antigua and Barbuda is among the smallest countries in the world and faces considerable challenges shared by many small island developing states (SIDS). On January 18, 2023, the country of around 100,000 people went to the polls to vote for a new parliament. The incumbent Antigua and Barbuda Labour Party (ABLP) under Prime Minister Gaston Browne went into the vote with a majority of 15 seats out of 17 seats, yet emerged with a reduced majority of only 9 seats. Although the ABLP retained power, the close election reflects the Eastern Caribbean country’s frustration with the brutal pandemic downturn and a prolonged economic recovery, fatigue with an incumbent government in power since 2014, and concern over the looming threat of climate change.

Prime Minister Browne’s government has presided over a challenging period in office, with the last three years shaped by tough global economic conditions, due to the pandemic and followed by the Russia-Ukraine War. The pandemic shut down the tourist industry, the country’s economic engine, with real GDP contracting by 20.2 percent in 2020—a striking downturn compared to Latin American and Caribbean’s average contraction of 7.0 percent in 2020 and even compared to the tourism-dependent Caribbean, which contracted by 9.4 percent. Although the economy rebounded over the next two years (by 4.8 percent in 2021 and 6.5 percent in 2022), it has yet to fully recover from pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, the economic plunge has hit the country hard with a 2021 report published by UNICEF, assessing that due to COVID-19 alone, the poverty rate is projected to increase nearly sixfold to 24 percent for all persons and 29 percent for children.

The Russia-Ukraine War is also complicating Antigua and Barbuda’s economic recovery. Higher oil prices have squeezed the dual-island state’s cost of electricity. Additionally, rising transportation costs resulted in higher consumer costs, especially for food. Considering that Antigua and Barbuda imports most of its food, rising transportation costs helped push daily costs for most Antiguans. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), national inflation shot up from 1.2 percent in 2021 to 10.5 percent in 2022. The tricky situation led the government to allow fuel price pass-through but implementing targeted subsidies to the transport and fishing sectors to maintain public transportation fares and seafood prices stable.

Moreover, as climate change worsens, the economic costs associated with its impact put even more pressure on the country’s already delicate public finances. In 2021, because of both the government’s tax exemptions to promote reconstruction efforts following the devastation left by Hurricane Irma 2017 and the COVID-19-related public spending, the country’s public debt to GDP ratio rose to high levels. According to the IMF, general government gross debt as a percent of GDP rose from 81.2 percent in 2019 to 101.5 percent in 2020, only heading below 100.0 percent in 2022 (at 91.2 percent of GDP). All the above served as a backdrop to the January 2023 elections.

Reflecting on the need to put the economy back on a sustained economic growth path and provide much-needed economic relief to those in need, ABLP’s political manifesto released on January 10, set five goals for the next five years, including the reduction of the cost of living; investing in water, electricity, and internet connection; repairing community roads; and creating conditions for full employment. To reduce the cost of living, ABLP proposed to increase wages and pensions of public servants, accelerate the clean energy transition to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports and bring electricity tariff down, no increase in the value-added tax, provide incentives in the agriculture and fisheries sectors to provide more affordable food, as well as to match the retirement age for all public and private sector workers. On infrastructure, ABLP promised to boost climate resilience infrastructure, and invest in the country’s main arterial roads and highways, work on community roads, improve water supply by installing more reverse osmosis plants, as well as remove duty on alternative green energy products for houses and businesses.

The lead opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP), which governed the island-state from 2004-2014, offered a change from what it portrayed as an old and tired government. Presenting itself as more pro-business, it promised to repeal and replace the Unincorporated Business Tax (UBT) and the incremental reduction of the corporate income tax from 25 percent to 15 percent. During the campaign, UPP leader Harold Lovell stated: “A UPP administration will place great emphasis on creating the pro-business, pro-ease of doing business environment. We believe that it is important for us to spur growth by making it easy for small, medium, and other businesses to compete and participate within the business environment.” By loosening regulations, the UPP has implied that they would make the country more competitive globally. The UPP manifesto also included promises to raise the minimum wage, salary increases for public servants, and support for a stable water supply.

The campaign between Antigua and Barbuda’s main parties was hard-fought, though there was little violence. Of note, arsonists set fire to a branch office of the ABLP. Beyond that, 70 percent of registered voters turned out to cast their ballots. The results proved that the ABLP had staying power, but that the events of the past several years have eroded the strong support for the ruling party. At the same time, the UPP demonstrated that it could make elections competitive again after its debacle in 2018 when it won only one seat. Rounding out the picture, Trevor Walker, head of the Barbuda People’s Movement (which is seeking to secure Barbudan people’s rights and land rights), won the sole seat for Antigua’s sovereign partner. One other seat was won by an independent, Asot Michael, who was a former ABLP member.

The political and economic landscape ahead for Antigua and Barbuda is challenging. Prime Minister Browne has a small majority and saw its share of the public vote fall by a little over 12 percent. A six-seat loss in a 17-seat parliamentary chamber is a humbling experience. It also reflects the durability of Antigua and Barbuda’s democratic tradition. Despite the economic challenges of the past three years, Antigua and Barbuda was able to hold elections without any major claims of fraud or discord. According to the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), the January 2023 election “reflects the will of voters.” The COG as well as the Organization of American States (OAS), which sent its own observer team, did note that there are areas that need improvement, including the need to address dealing with the shortcomings in the accuracy and transparency of the voters’ list and the efficiency of the tallying process.

Looking ahead, with its economy projected to reach pre-pandemic levels after 2025, post-election Antigua and Barbuda faces a challenging economic landscape. The large external shocks hitting Antigua and Barbuda over the past three years led to questions about the country’s growth model.

Indeed, besides its vulnerability to external shocks such as tropical cyclones, pandemics, and global economic crises, the expansion of the tourism sector has also raised environmental and human rights concerns. A recent report commissioned by the Barbuda Council, conducted by the UK-based Global Action Legal Network, pointed out that the privatization scheme used to build new infrastructure projects on the island severely threatens human rights and the environment. According to the report, the laws enacted by Antigua and Barbuda’s government to attract foreign capital not only enable international investors to build luxury properties without the need to consult local communities, but also obliterates hundreds of years of communal land ownership on the island. On February 2022, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed, “in the midst of a global climate crisis and a pandemic, it is shocking to see the development of a yacht marina in an area known for its fragile ecosystem and a golf course on an island that relies on scarce groundwater resources,” calling on the Government of Antigua and Barbuda and the investors to urgently “employ rights-based and nature-based solutions to address current challenges including in conserving and restoring wetlands.”

Moreover, like most Caribbean countries, Antigua and Barbuda’s profitable citizenship-by-investment program (CBI) is also the subject of scrutiny due to its alleged lack of transparency. In March 2022, as the European Parliament voted to phase out its member states CBI programs. Likewise, last year, in an effort to prevent criminals and traffickers from abusing similar programs, U.S. legislators introduced the “No Travel for Traffickers Act” to Congress—a piece of legislation aimed at banning the “participation of countries that sells passports in the U.S. Visa Wavier Program,” as well as mandating “the Executive Branch list publicly all countries with citizenship-by-investment.”

As Prime Minister Browne becomes one of the country’s longest-serving heads of government, a series of challenges loom large. With a reinvigorated opposition, eroding popular support, growing external and internal questions over the country’s economic model, and the need to secure sustainable economic growth amidst the climate crisis, the next five years will be crucial for the ABLP’s future to remain as the dominant political force of Antigua and Barbuda.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Research Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. His latest book, The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean, was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.

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In a little over three weeks, Brazilians will go to the polls to vote for their country’s next president, vice president, and national congress, as well as for governors and state legislative assemblies. At stake is who will sit at the helm of Latin America’s most populous nation and largest economy, one of the world’s most significant commodity producers and home to the Amazon Rainforest (a critical component to a carbon neutral future). It is still a competitive election. The big question is whether the incumbent president, Jair Bolsonaro, will recognize the election results. Bolsonaro, currently behind former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in polls, has alternated between promising a peaceful transfer of power and stating that he will not turn over his office if there is electoral fraud. If he refuses to acknowledge the outcome, where does Brazil go from there?  

The biggest worry for most Brazilians is the economy, which cooled this year after a strong rebound in 2021. The country has been hit by successive blows, including COVID-19 (and its lingering impact), the slowdown in Chinese demand for commodities (the Asian country is a major trade partner), and, most recently, the Russo-Ukrainian War (which injected greater volatility into global commodity markets). Real GDP growth in 2022 will likely struggle to reach 2.0 percent, unemployment stands around 9.1 percent, and inflation in August was 8.7 percent year-on-year. For most Brazilian households, this has made the economy the number one issue, followed by concerns over hunger and poverty, health and the pandemic, and corruption. Yet the political arena in this election has also been shaped by political personalities.   

Brazil’s 2022 presidential contest is a highly polarized affair between President Bolsonaro and Lula, the candidate for the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT). Bolsonaro is often described as a far-right populist with autocratic tendencies, and he is a strong admirer of Donald Trump and Brazil’s 1964-1985 military regime. A controversial figure in Brazil, he has also received international condemnation for his vulgar rhetoric and hostility toward his country’s LGBTQ and Indigenous communities. At the same time, Bolsonaro is a master of social media, portraying himself as an outsider to Brazil’s cozy political elites and dismissing criticism as “fake news.” 

In 2018, Bolsonaro took on a PT that was hobbled by a struggling economy, public frustration with corruption exposed in the Lava Jato investigations, and deep concerns over rising violent crime. Lula was convicted of money laundering and corruption in 2017, while his successor Dilma Rousseff, also from the PT, was impeached in 2016. Significantly, Bolsonaro was able to tap a deeply conservative part of Brazilian society, which is largely rural or concentrated in small towns, and gain the support of conservative evangelicals.

Although Bolsonaro’s administration has been marked by considerable upheaval, including COVID-19 (which he downplayed), strong international condemnation for the destruction of parts of the Amazon rainforest, stalled economic reforms, and a number of corruption scandals (including allegations involving his sons and wife), he has maintained the support of a hard core of 30-35 percent of voters, which is enough to make him competitive in the current election.

Bolsonaro has relentlessly questioned the integrity of Brazil’s electronic voting system, which is highly regarded internationally. Indeed, Bolsonaro sought to replace the electronic voting system (in place since 1996) with a paper receipt system. The effort was defeated, but he continues to claim that the 2022 elections could be affected by fraud due to electronic voting.    

Most polls indicate that the president will lose. According to an Isepe/Abrapel poll released on September 17, Lula has 45 percent of voting intentions in the first round, and Bolsonaro has 35 percent, while the other two major candidates, Ciro Gomes and Simone Tebet, hold seven and five percent respectively. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the votes, the top two vote-winners will advance to a runoff; assuming Lula and Bolsonaro do so, the same poll forecasts that Lula would win with 53 percent of the vote.

Lula is hardly a perfect candidate, having been marred by corruption and jail time. (Lula’s convictions were later thrown out, and he denies any wrongdoing.) However, his two terms in office coincided with a major commodity boom and economic expansion, which through targeted social programs, helped pull many Brazilians up from extreme poverty and into an expanding middle class. Moreover, the business community, which expected ideological intransigence when Lula entered office in 2003, came to respect him as a pragmatic leftist whom they could work with. Lula’s second term proved more divisive, and the problems escalated under Rousseff, who was hit by the end of the commodity boom and a series of corruption scandals resulting in mass anti-government demonstrations.    

Today the polarization in Brazilian politics is evident in opinion polls. When potential voters were asked, “Which option gives you the most fear?,” 46 percent of respondents stated, “The continuing of Bolsonaro,” while another 40 percent feared the return of the Workers Party.

The poll mirrors a sharp difference between the two candidates, with Bolsonaro appearing more of a one-man phenomenon who has been backed by a handful of credible ministers (some of whom have since parted company with their boss). In 2018, he ran as presidential candidate for the tiny Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal). By 2019, however, Bolsonaro had abandoned the party. Bolsonaro is now running under the banner of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), which is populist-conservative, nationalist, pro-Christian, and economically liberal, but which has been influenced by the president more than it has influenced him.

In contrast, Lula has the support of the PT organization, which has its own strong national brand and is generally considered to be a social democratic party with socialist roots. The PT is among the largest parties in the country, with strong support among the working class, in the North and Northwest regions of the country, and in a number of major urban centers, including Rio de Janeiro. For Lula to win convincingly in the first round, he needs to win middle class voters, which is proving to be a challenge.

While Lula leads in the polls, it is possible for the gap between the two candidates to shrink. Whether Bolsonaro loses in the first round or in the second, it is difficult to imagine Bolsonaro acknowledging his defeat. If he alleges fraud, Bolsonaro could prompt a constitutional crisis, raising questions over the role of the military, which has remained influential but not active in the country’s politics.

If Bolsonaro wins, Brazil could face an equally daunting challenge: four more years of a leader who, like Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has little appreciation for the finer points of democratic government. Considering the level of passion from Bolsonaro supporters and the large number of Brazilians who dislike the president, Brazil could remain a highly polarized country and runs the risk of slipping into a political landscape where groups from the left and right express themselves more forcibly through non-constitutional means.

Looking ahead, October is a pivotal month for Brazil. Opinion polls point to a runoff and eventually a Lula victory, but elections are not over until the votes are counted. That is what makes Bolsonaro’s persistent claims of a rigged election so potentially damaging. He has set the stage for his voters to question any Lula victory, no matter how wide. If Bolsonaro wins the election, his victory will quickly raise concerns over the fate of democratic and constitutional norms. When Brazilian voters cast their ballots on October 2, 2022, the political roulette table will start to spin.

Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Research Fellow at Global Americans, and founding Director of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. His latest book, The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean, was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.

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Participants:

• Guy Mentel (President, Global Americans)
• Georges Fauriol (Global Americans Caribbean Fellow and Co-Chair, Carribean Policy Consortium)
• David Lewis (Co-Chair, Caribbean Policy consortium)
• Amparo Mercader (Partner, PwC)
• Richard Feinberg (Professor Emeritus, UC San Diego and Member of the Global Americans International Advisory Council)
• Alicia Nicholls (Research Fellows, Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade Law, Policy, & Services)

Georges Fauriol began the event with an opening presentation, summarizing the outcomes of the Summit of the Americas, held last month in Los Angeles. Even before the summit took place, it had already generated controversy among regional leaders due to the exclusion of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Several of the initiatives launched at the summit—including the Americas Partnership for Prosperity, the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030, and the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection—risk becoming little more than “policy by pronouncement” unless countries follow up with proper implementation.

Following Fauriol’s comments, Guy Mentel moderated a discussion among the panelists. The conversation covered climate change mitigation and adaptation, trade and investment, nearshoring, regional integration, immigration, energy, and the crisis in Haiti, among other topics.

Quotes

Georges Fauriol: “Often the side-shows at summits (between varying actors like NGOs and the private sector) are quite positive for building consensus. Particularly for the Caribbean at this summit, on food and energy security.”

Georges Fauriol: “[The IX Summit of the Americas] furthered a U.S. tendency of instituting policy by pronouncement.”

Alicia Nicholls: “[The fact that] Cuba is one of the largest sources of immigration to the U.S. provides some context as to why some Caribbean governments insisted on Cuba’s inclusion at the summit.”

Alicia Nicholls: “The flow of guns is an important issue that needs to be addressed as it has had serious implications for the Caribbean. A great number of guns are coming in illegally from the United States. There are also implications for investments, with regards to developing purposes, as investors won’t invest in development projects that they believe will be shot up or ruined.”

David Lewis: “[For Southern Caribbean countries,] climate change is an endemic, existential threat, but that these countries need income, jobs, and opportunities today. Those needs must feature in any diplomatic discussion.”

David Lewis: “For the very first time, the demand from the region in this case, CARICOM is now putting the items on the agenda to the US, not being an agenda taker, but being an agenda maker.”

Richard Feinberg: “[At the first Summit of the Americas in 1994,] Argentina led the call for the [Free Trade Area of the Americas], Brazil championed democracy promotion, and Honduras and Venezuela put forward proposals on corruption. How have things changed since.”

Richard Feinberg: “I give points to the administration for not focusing on China. It was never explicitly brought up, and they deserve credit on that.”

Amparo Mercader: “If the U.S. cannot agree on [a free trade agreement]; customs agreements, services promotion, and double-taxation agreements would be welcome compromises.”

Amparo Mercader: “Nearshoring is as much a political as a business move. It builds resilience and diversifies resources, just in case. Many U.S. companies are diversifying resources away from China, but instead of relocating to the hemisphere, [they’re moving] mostly to other Asian countries.”

Read Richard Feinberg’s article in Global Americans: IX Summit of the Americas: Creative Diplomacy for a Fractured World.

Read Guy Mentel and Jackson Mihm’s article in Global Americans: The U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030: A Timely Initiative Worthy of Serious Investment.

Learn more about the Caribbean Policy Consortium: www.cpccaribbean.org.

Learn more about the Global Americans High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean: https://theglobalamericans.org/climate-change-caribbean/.

The post Event: Post-Summit of the Americas Assessments for the Hemisphere: A Caribbean Perspective appeared first on Global Americans.

The Uruguayan social security system currently covers nearly 90 percent of Uruguay’s senior citizens, making it one of Latin America’s most robust. It is based on a mixed regime characterized by a public-administrated intergenerational solidarity system and a private-led mandatory individual saving scheme. However World Bank analysts argue that the system needs an urgent reform, as right now it is financially unsustainable both in the medium and long term. In 2018, its total cost represented 11 percent of Uruguay’s GDP. Without the constant direct financial assistance from the Uruguayan government the system cannot function, as it does not generates enough funds to transfer to its beneficiaries. This financial burden, which is only expected to grow, as the country’s birth rate remains low and the life expectancy increases, poses a significant threat to Uruguay’s welfare state stability. 

Indeed, in 2017 former Uruguayan President Tabaré Vázquez warned that if the country did not pursue a social security reform, the entire system would eventually break down. In Vázquez’s estimation, “sometimes making reforms is painful, but there is no other medicine than to make them,” However, his center-left government ended up doing little to promulgate a reform.

Although they are necessary, social security reforms are the type of reforms that no government wants to make. In France, President Emmanuel Macron is likely to try once again to reform his country’s crumbling social security system following his recent election. His first attempt in late 2019 was met with furious protests and France’s longest strike in over 50 years. Similarly, in other advanced democracies like Japan, where the birth rate is notably low and the population life span has increased more than ever before, politicians have been struggling for years now over how to keep the system financially solvent amidst rising public debt. 

In Latin America, Uruguay is not alone. A growing number of countries now realize that they cannot delay their retirement system reforms any longer. Analysts from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that governments in the region are facing serious challenges to increase the number of people covered, as well as to provide sufficient resources to the beneficiaries. Although the average Latin American is younger than the average European, the aging trend remains similar. By 2050, the Latin American population aged 65 or older is projected to grow from 8 percent to 17.5 percent.

In recent years, some countries in the region started to discuss and implement reforms aimed to restructure their social security systems. In 2017, former Argentine President Mauricio Macri’s center-right coalition passed a controversial reform amidst fierce street protests and a surprising level of mobilization from the middle and upper classes. The reform included a new formula to calculate pensions, and it increased the optional retirement age from 65 to 70 years old for men and 60 to 63 years old for women. In 2018, in Nicaragua, mass protests erupted after the Ortega regime attempted to overhaul the social security system by decree. Although they abandoned the reform, President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, responded to the crisis by cracking down on opponents, committing gross human rights violations, and dismantling what was left of Nicaragua’s democracy. In Chile, following the 2019 social protests, the demand to change the country’s private pension system became one of the protestors’ main petitions. 

Like newly inaugurated President Gabriel Boric, who promised Chileans that he will reform the social security system, Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou also pledged during the 2019 presidential campaign that social security reform would be one of his top priorities. Together with his center-right coalition members from the Partido Colorado, Cabildo Abierto, Partido Independiente, and Partido de la Gente, he signed a document called “Compromiso por el país” (Commitment for the Country) to start a process to reform the social security system. According to the document, the next system ought to be “modern and financially sound” and based on a “solid technical consistency and broad political support.”

In the first two years of his presidency, following 15 years of center-left governance under the Frente Amplio, Lacalle Pou faced the unprecedented sanitary, economic, and social repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the response received support from the majority of Uruguayans, as well as international recognition for the quick and effective vaccination campaign, Lacalle Pou had to postpone much of his agenda. Moreover, in July 2021, the Frente Amplio, the main opposition party, and the PIT-CNT, Uruguay’s largest trade union organization, announced that they reached the 700,000 signatures needed to call for a  referendum to partially repeal Lacalle Pou’s Urgent Consideration Law (LUC, for its initial in Spanish)—an omnibus bill passed in early 2020. In late March 2022, after a heated referendum campaign that kept all political actors occupied for months, Lacalle Pou and his coalition were able to avoid the partial repeal by a thin margin of votes.

President Lacalle Pou hoped that his referendum victory would offer him more time, as well as a stronger mandate, to pursue a series of reforms, including on social security, that are key to reducing Uruguay’s high public spending. However, the economic shockwaves of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has posed a threat to Uruguay’s economic recovery from the pandemic. Rising food and oil prices have lowered Uruguayan consumers’ expectations. Fears that inflation could once again drive down real wages has prompted Lacalle Pou’s economic team to announce a series of measures such as tax exemptions on certain basic products and an increase in public sector salaries and pensions.

In this economic and political context, it is worth asking if President Lacalle Pou and his coalition will eventually keep their promise and pursue a social security reform. In early 2020, his administration made important progress by setting up a commission of experts from across the political spectrum to make a diagnosis and propose measures to reform the system. 

The commission report was straightforward: Uruguay needs to reform its social security system. Uruguay’s per capita social security spending is similar to that of Spain and above that of other wealthy countries such as Denmark or Norway—all three of them with populations older than the Uruguayan population. In 2018, 50.8 percent of Uruguay’s social public expenditure corresponded to social security, far above health care (24.2 percent) and education (18.4 percent). According to the commission of experts, the Uruguayan government must reform social security to guarantee other social programs, which are equally fundamental to Uruguayans’ wellbeing and prosperity. Hence they proposed to create a new formula to calculate pensions and increase the minimum retirement age from 60 to 65 years old (On average, the current retirement age is between 62 and 63 years old.)

Now, the decision whether to send a reform bill to Congress rests with President Lacalle Pou. The Frente Amplio and the PIT-CNT have already announced that they oppose raising the retirement age. Although Lacalle Pou has the votes needed in both chambers to pass a reform, the window of opportunity is closing faster than previously thought. The current economic uncertainty triggered by the war in Ukraine, together with the upcoming election season, could make Lacalle Pou’s coalition partners and even his own Partido Nacional prefer to avoid sensitive issues. Recent polls suggest that 69 percent of Uruguayans opposed the rising retirement age and think that it should be kept at 60 years old. Although the content of the reform remains uncertain, what is clear is that political actors need to clearly communicate and convince the population about the importance of reforms. As recent episodes suggest, a social security reform is a sensitive issue and will require broad popular support to head off social unrest.

Alejandro Trenchi is an intern at Global Americans. He received a master’s in political science from Leiden University. Follow Alejandro on Twitter: @trenchiale

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The government of Cuba has been planning an economic comeback with the help of the World Health Organization (WHO), which is considering emergency approval of one to four of Cuba’s five locally-produced COVID-19 vaccines. Cuba’s vaccine development helps explain why it has embarked on fierce repression after mass protests last July and why the country has refrained from needed economic reforms to alleviate its economic crisis.

The WHO and its regional representative, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), were early cheerleaders of its decision to start developing five COVID-19 vaccines in early 2020. Historically, both organizations have accepted Cuba’s reported data while disregarding conflicting information from independent sources and experts not beholden to Cuba’s authoritarian government.

Cuba already produces and commercializes several vaccines, and its friends and allies dismiss reports of systematic data manipulation and purchase its medical products and services uncompetitively. Moreover, few outside of Cuba know that many citizens, including numerous health workers, died during the COVID-19 spike of 2021 despite having the required three doses of the local vaccines. Emergency approval by the WHO precludes long-term evaluation of effectiveness or side effects, and large-scale production risks are only obvious a posteriori.

Far-left outlets have heralded Cuba’s “unique model of vaccine internationalism” on “behalf of the world’s poor,” as mainstream media including NPR, Bloomberg, NBC, CNBC, ABC, and The Washington Post herald Cuba’s so-called achievements and intentions uncritically. Unfortunately, the global poor won’t be fully informed about the WHO-approved Cuban vaccine—they’ve lacked protection and recourse for decades while Cuba’s “internationalist” doctors are allowed to practice in scores of countries with unverified credentials despite questionable training.

Cuba’s COVID-19 vaccines are of the traditional protein sub-unit type, composed of a fraction of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein, and its biotech industry produces eight such vaccines, some of which are exported. Cuba’s biotech industry is a state-sponsored monopoly, it operates with a weak legal and regulatory framework, lacks transparency and adequate sanitary standards, and conducts aberrant clinical trials as well as other unethical medical practices. Despite exporting products to 40 countries, it pays its employees miserly wages in worthless local currency. Finally, U.S. foreign policy officials and intelligence agencies suspect that Cuba conceals a bio-warfare program.

The Cuban government diverted resources for essential and life-saving medication needed in real-time to engage in a risky production of five different vaccine candidates to treat a new virus in competition with top global bio-pharmaceutical conglomerates. In January the president of the state-owned BioCubaFarma conglomerate explained why medication was extremely scarce for most citizens. He confirmed that the state had diverted 50 percent of the financing needed to import raw materials and inputs for the local production of drugs in order to develop and produce vaccines against COVID-19 and drugs in the virus treatment protocol, apparently available only to the nomenklatura and hard currency-paying tourists.

Cuba also plans to expand COVID-19 vaccine production through third-country technology transfer and has already negotiated such agreements with Iran, Venezuela, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Argentina. This development would translate into new partnerships in biotechnology, further increasing its global influence. Government authorities have said that Cuba could produce 120 to 200 million doses a year, which at USD $5 per dose—more than what bulk AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccines have cost some countries—would generate minimum gross annual revenues of $600 million to $1 billion. Earnings would greatly multiply from higher per-dose rates, increased productive capacity, third-country production, support services, and medical brigades sent by Cuba as part of the vaccine package.

The medical brigades are part of a rare state business, which the U.S. Department of State, among others, considers a form of trafficking in persons in violation of international law. Presented as humanitarian “collaboration,” the brigades generate export services officially constituting Cuba’s primary source of revenues. Furthermore, they are used to bolster populist regimes to help masquerade clandestine deployments of Cuban intelligence and military personnel. Cuba used this formula to spread its brand in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, which poses a grave threat to the region.

The flood of revenues would fund the Cuban regime’s vast apparatus for repression, propaganda, and intelligence, which operates internally and internationally. It would enable Cuba’s leaders to remain in power and continue expanding their international influence.

COVID-19 vaccines and related exports cannot ultimately rescue the faltering Cuban economy, and the local biotechnology industry lacks critical aspects for long-term, sustained growth. However, in the short-to-medium term, vaccine sales would greatly strengthen the dictatorship, neutralize the consequences of its extensive human rights abuses, and postpone the ultimate reckoning of its failed system. Vaccine sales would also defuse pressure for urgent economic reforms that would improve the lives of the suffering Cuban people, and they would weaken the pro-democracy movement.

The possibility of this alarming scenario calls for full transparency and careful oversight of the WHO vaccine evaluation process, as well as of the WHO and PAHO programs in Cuba. Vaccine approval should be conditioned on an in-depth evaluation of Cuba’s bio-pharmaceutical industry by an independent board of experts conducting unannounced, random visits to any laboratory, production plant, or health institution in Cuba. Additionally, the WHO and PAHO should interview émigré medical personnel not subject to reprisal from the Cuban state.

Medical and other civil society organizations of countries contemplating biotech purchases from Cuba should demand that their governments carefully address all of the above concerns. Procurement of any approved Cuban vaccines by any government or international organization, particularly GAVI, should be fair and transparent.

Finally, democratic governments should discontinue funding the Cuban government and any of its entities with loans or aid and, instead, channel humanitarian assistance through churches and verifiable independent groups, as well as support human rights initiatives.

Maria C. Werlau is the Executive Director of the non-profit CubaArchive.org.

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The situation is even more worrying in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the 2019 Global Burden of Disease study, more than half of the region’s population were categorized as overweight or obese with 10 percent of adults living with diabetes. There is a close link between poor diet and NCDs. Poor eating habits have not only been linked to obesity but also other diseases. Of particular concern is the high intake of products with high calorie, sugar, fat, and sodium content, but low in nutritional value.

NCDs affect individuals and impact public health services by generating high costs of treatment and care. In particular, low and middle-income countries suffer the cumulative economic losses caused by NCDs, estimated to have cost more than USD $7 billion during 2011-2025. Unsurprisingly, the commercial food industry plays a very important role in promoting unhealthy eating habits. Food companies heavily market processed and ultra-processed foods without considering the impact their intake may have on a population’s health.

Food Labeling in Latin America

Similar to global statistics, NCDs also make up the leading cause of death in Argentina. Argentina’s 2018 ‘National Survey of Risk Factors for Chronic Diseases’ shows that of its 45 million inhabitants, 66 percent are overweight, 42 percent suffer from high blood pressure, 32 percent are obese, and 30 percent suffer from high cholesterol levels. The most alarming figure shows that 41 percent of Argentine children, aged between 5 and 17, are overweight, and 13.6 percent of those children are under five.

To safeguard the nation’s health, governments are obligated to place regulatory measures that mitigate the growth of NCDs. Front-of-package warning labels represent a popular measure for policymakers. Following the lead of Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Mexico, the Argentine Congress ratified a law obliging companies in the food industry to include front-of-package labels that warn the consumers of products that may pose a long-term health risk.

The Argentine law covers the entire food production supply chain, including manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and others involved in the value chain. A black octagonal label, occupying not less than five percent of the package surface, must be placed at the front indicating the product’s ingredients. The label must warn the consumer of excessive sugar, sodium, saturated fat, total fat, and calories and warn the consumer of caffeine or sweetener ingredients.

Chile implemented front-of-package food labels in 2016 with positive results. Impact assessments show that this law contributed to healthier consumer habits alongside a considerable reduction in the sale of ultra-processed products. Mexico ratified a similar law in 2020 inspired by the Chilean legislation. However, unlike Chile’s law, Mexico will require products containing any sweetener or caffeine to show front-of-packing warning labels to deter child consumption.

Nonetheless, similar examples elsewhere show the limitations of labeling. In Uruguay, food warning labels became effective in 2021, though originally ratified in 2018 under Decree 272 because Congress altered the original resolution. Reportedly, the food industry ensured its interests by challenging state regulations to effectively change the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) nutrient profiling system “to the obvious detriment of public health.” Therefore, companies in Uruguay can sell “seal-free” products which contain excess fat, sugar, and sodium contents

Front-Package Regulation: An Effective Regulation or Not?

Undoubtedly, warning labels positively contribute to the fight against NCDs. However, policymakers need to address several other aspects to safeguard and regulate public nutrition and health:

Evolving social trends have drastically impacted consumer habits. For example, the popularity of takeaway meals, street food vendors, and growing fast-food chain restaurants have facilitated the consumption of processed foods. Primarily in urban contexts, these accessible, cheap, and highly palatable alternatives are more suited to the faster-paced lifestyles of cities. According to PAHO, 75 percent of the world’s population will live in major cities by 2050. 

Another important development within the fast-food industry that curtails front-of-package label laws is the global growth in e-commerce. Driven by the pandemic, the popular use of food delivery services, promoted through mobile apps and social networks, vastly reinforced unhealthy consumer habits during lockdown measures. So much so that consumer behavior post-lockdown shows a continued reliance on food delivery services.

Unfortunately, the warning label law has little to no impact on e-commerce food advertising or delivery services, lest on commercial fast-food suppliers or small-scale vendors. In general terms, this porous regulation and political complacency have strengthened the position of multinational food corporations. The fast food industry’s rapid growth and increased capitalization demonstrate the power of food corporations.

Additionally, food donations to the vulnerable have long been at the hands of public and private organizations, whereby the quality and nutritional value of donated food is inconsequential. Although the Argentine law specifies that companies cannot donate food with front-of-package labels, it does not mention whether it prohibits the state or NGOs from donating these unhealthy products.

The quality of food consumed by the most vulnerable, as individuals with less autonomy over their consumption decisions or health, should by no means be compromised. Therefore, it is ethically imperative to regulate food donations that respect the food insecure and ensure that donated food maintains its nutritional value. Not least, as such, regulation guarantees the accountability of actors and therefore encourages healthier donations.

What About Companies’ Trademark Rights?

In 2010, three subsidiary companies of multinational tobacco company Philip Morris International (PMI) filed a suit before the International Center for Settlement of Investor Disputes (ICSID). The plaintiffs alleged that large warning labels covering 80% of cigarette packets, required under Uruguayan law, expropriated their property rights of trademarks without compensation. However, the tribunal dismissed their claim arguing that “the measures had no substantive effect in depriving the claimants of the value of their investments in general” and underlined the state’s right to “regulate in view of the common good.”

Similarly, Argentine society’s right to health, which is under judicial review, should also be more important than a company’s investment rights. Could we see a similar situation unfold against front-of-package food labeling? The expropriation argument is relevant to generic labeling. One might argue that a company’s right to property is infringed upon, whereby food companies could argue the violation of their trademarks. However, as evinced by PMI’s case in Uruguay, front-of-package labeling seldom deprives a company’s ability to sell processed products in instances where labels do not directly impact investment value.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the danger of non-communicable diseases. These underlying health conditions pose a higher risk of serious illness and fatality when compared to COVID-19. Therefore, multi-sectoral and comprehensive health policies, which view health holistically and not as isolated compartments, are crucial. As urbanization grows and more citizens migrate to cities, the development of cities must incorporate “health in all public policies” and identify consumption habits and their impact on society as a long-term solution to combatting all NCDs.

Policymakers should also adjust the price controls that include carbonated drinks and alcohol according to the progressive objectives underscored by its front-of-package label law. The government must also cement front-of-package legislation so that future governments cannot veto. In addition, governments must take a stronger stance against aggressive marketing strategies of ultra-processed products, regulate the growth and expansion of fast-food chains, and adapt to evolving consumer habits driven by unregulated e-commerce laws.

Building progressive eating habits and behavior is a long-term goal. The government must reach consumers with reliable information through conventional and unconventional channels. After all, people will not stop consuming unhealthy food unless the viable alternatives are palatable and accessible.

Ezequiel Carman is a former consultant with Global Americans. Delfina Scagliotti and Ryan Arenas are former interns with Global Americans.

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2022 will likely be a mercurial, but ultimately very difficult year for Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Biden administration’s engagement in the region. The year will begin with hope that the region is slowly gaining the upper hand in its battle with COVID-19, and that the continuing string of victories by left-of-center parties, the consolidation of authoritarian populism, and the advance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will not have the negative consequences that some fear. By the end of the year, that optimism will likely be strained by a combination of problematic behavior by radical left and populist authoritarian regimes, further significant electoral advances of the populist left, and increasing challenges from organized crime, political instability, fiscal and economic crises, and refugee flows. The year will likely also feature continued diplomatic, economic, political, and security penetration of the region by the PRC, as well as a notably weakened U.S. voice in both multilateral affairs and bilateral political and security engagement to address such challenges.

A Hopeful Beginning?

In the early months of the year, the newly elected radical left government of Xiomara Castro in Honduras will likely seek positive relations with the Biden administration, building on shared interests in development, social justice, protection of disadvantaged groups, and cooperation in prosecuting corrupt actors tied to the outgoing regime of Juan Orlando Hernández. Indeed, Castro may delay her campaign pledge to diplomatically recognize the PRC to avoid souring relations with Washington, while seeking to extract more concessions from longtime partner Taiwan. In Chile, the inexperienced incoming Boric administration, hampered by a divided Congress, may move slowly and seek consensus, leading some to speculate that conservative fears of Boric becoming a new Salvador Allende were overblown. Similarly, the regime of Pedro Castillo in Peru will continue to be stymied by its own internal difficulties and a conservative, if fragmented, Congress.

In Mexico, expanding economic engagement, new agreements on security cooperation, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador’s hopes that Democrats in the U.S. Congress will provide a pathway to citizenship for Mexicans in the United States, will create the illusion of a reasonably healthy U.S.-Mexico relationship.

In Costa Rica, the centrist National Liberation Party (PLN) may prevail in February’s wide-open national elections and forced to govern moderately with a multi-party congress.

In Colombia, the increasing visible consequences of the rest of the region’s turn to the left, particularly in neighboring Venezuela, may lead the country to rally around a centrist alternative to former M-19 guerrilla Gustavo Petro as president or elect a Congress that limits his ability to impose a radical agenda if elected.

Pro-U.S. voices like Iván Duque in Colombia, Guillermo Lasso in Ecuador, Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic, Irfaan Ali in Guyana, and Luis Lacalle Pou in Uruguay will provide superficial reassurance that despite victories by a diverse array of leftist groups in the region, the United States still has many friends.

In countries from El Salvador and Nicaragua to Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, governments face an environment of uncertainty and fiscal constraints arising from continuing expenditures against COVID-19 and associated lockdown measures. Given this context, Chinese projects will likely move slowly and Chinese loan offers will have few takers. Some Chinese projects, like the Las Bambas mine in Peru, will be impaired by social unrest, leading some to emphasize the limitations of PRC-based companies and the overblown nature of the Chinese threat.

While not every bad thing that could happen in Latin America will happen, the occurrence of some, if not all, of the following events is likely to sour the optimism that some will find at the beginning of 2022:

In Venezuela, expanded oil production, helped in part by the China National Oil Development Corporation’s re-engagement, will complement Russian arms, Iranian support, and an emboldened Nicolás Maduro to increase Venezuela’s risk to its neighbors. Violence involving terrorist groups in Venezuela, such as the FARC and ELN, will raise the prospect of military action spilling over into the territory of Venezuela’s neighbors.

In Chile, the influence of the Communist Party in Boric’s coalition, combined with the frustration of his attempts at accommodating the right and center, the enabling effect of Chinese money, and Boric’s need to rally his base toward approving the new draft constitution likely to be released mid-year, will likely radicalize his government’s politics.

In Brazil—which comprises nearly half of the population and landmass and over a third of the economy of South America—the Workers Party (PT) and its head Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, radicalized from his time in prison, are increasingly likely to be elected in October, decisively shifting the balance in multilateral institutions such as Mercosur, CELAC, and the OAS.

In Argentina, the government’s inability to meet significant 2022 debt payments, combined with its hard line in renegotiating them, could lead to a new default on its IMF loans. A default would strengthen the hand of Cristina Fernández de Kircher’s radical wing of the Peronist movement and accelerate the Argentine government’s embrace of China, including not only loans, but also rail, hydroelectric, nuclear, solar, and other infrastructure projects and expanded investment in extracting lithium. The need for Chinese money may help Argentina’s formal commitment to buy the Chinese FC-1 fighter (a decision due in 2022), and other strategic cooperation such as PLA presence in the space radar facility in Neuquén and a possible role in the new polar logistics base in Ushuaia.

In Costa Rica, the inability of the incoming government to meet austerity measures, postponed until after the election, could constrain the new administration and increase its interest in turning to the PRC to fund investment projects.

In Mexico, AMLO’s eventual frustration with the likely failure of a realistic path to citizenship for Mexicans in the United States, escalating tensions regarding his anti-business initiatives in the electricity, petroleum, and other sectors, his increasing reliance on PRC funding for projects from Tren Maya and the Bacanora lithium deposits to PRC-owned Zuma energy, and increasing pressure from the Biden administration on security cooperation and anti-corruption initiatives will likely oblige AMLO into an increasingly anti-U.S. posture.

In Honduras by the end of the year, more radical actors within the Partido Libre, bolstered by Cuba and Venezuela, may force an eventual break with the Biden administration and Castro’s recognition of the PRC to escape dependency on Western investment.

In Nicaragua, the November 2021 reappearance of Chinese developer Wang Jing suggests a possible 2022 resurrection of the interoceanic Nicaragua Canal project. In 2022, the newly formed Nicaragua-China relationship could also give rise to purchases of Chinese military equipment, plus cooperation on security issues and surveillance and information architectures, complementing the role of Russia in making Nicaragua less isolated, less broke, and thus more threatening.

On the China-Taiwan competition, 2022 will likely see the Caribbean become a new area of focus, including the possibility of a flip by the current government of Saint Lucia (which currently recognizes Taiwan but previously recognized the PRC), or by the next government in Haiti. As the region moves beyond the economic paralysis of COVID-19, a range of temporarily stalled Chinese projects may begin, and the role of Chinese companies in 5G, biotech, ridesharing, and other e-commerce will contributing to a sense that PRC-based companies are advancing everywhere.

Across Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the deterioration of the security situation and the continuing influence of organized crime will highlight the cost of the lost U.S. ability to engage, let alone substantially influence, its partners in the region, even tiny El Salvador, on issues of organized crime, immigration, or China, or secure cooperation on such issues in once reliable multilateral institutions such as the OAS.

That visibly weakened U.S. posture will contribute strongly to the recapture of the House of Representatives by the Republican Party in the November 2022 U.S. midterm elections. The result will likely be more conflict, stagnation, and attention to the increasing challenges for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, albeit not likely significant solutions under a split Congress.

In short, in 2022, the United States will find that after a few initial signs of hope, the hemisphere to which it is intimately bound by ties of geography, commerce, and family is more dangerous, less democratic, less stable, less willing to cooperate, and more engaged than ever with its extra-regional rivals. Predictions are imperfect, however. It is possible that some of the anticipated glimmers of hope at the beginning of the year will fail to materialize, and the region will plunge more rapidly into crisis.

Evan Ellis is Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the position of the Army War College or the U.S. government.

The post Latin America and the Caribbean: Predictions for 2022 appeared first on Global Americans.

Read the latest report by Ivelaw Griffith, a Global Americans Fellow, on Vaccination and Vaccine Diplomacy in the Caribbean.

The current pace [of vaccine access and inoculation] will take us a while to reach the herd immunity required to return our economies to productive levels or minimize the emergence of variants.

– Dr. Joy St. John, Executive Director, Caribbean Public Health Agency

Stop listening to Anancy stories. Stop listening to people who are less informed, less educated than yourselves … and false narratives about the vaccines. There are some deep-seated fears and emotions and even religious and ideological views on vaccines … but that argument bears little value in the context of how medicine and science have combined with faith to heal the world.

– Edmund Bartlett, Tourism Minister of Jamaica

The Caribbean and the rest of the world continue to battle COVID-19, the modern-day plague. The scientific, public health, and policy communities within various countries and around the world have marshaled a variety of weapons to counter the pandemic. In addition to critical medical and healthcare staff, these include hand sanitizers, testing kits, oxygen, personal protective equipment (PPE) such as face masks and shields, and ventilators, among other equipment. As the pandemic raged in 2020 and 2021, officials placed a considerable premium on developing vaccines to control, if not prevent, infections and fatalities. Indeed, some scholars posit that “vaccination against diseases, including preventable, contagious, and life-threatening illnesses, is the best public health intervention after water sanitation.” (Ortiz-Prado et al, 2021). Vaccinations have become the central focus in our campaign against COVID-19.

Yet, notwithstanding the growing scholarly literature about the pandemic in the Caribbean (see Byron et al., 2020; Chattu and Chami, 2020; and Blazy et al, 2021; for example), few have specifically studied vaccination in the Caribbean. This study, which is a follow-up to an earlier one (Griffith, 2021), aims to help fill this gap. It does so first by offering an appreciation of the various vaccines being employed, and then examining the role of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and other state and non-state actors involved in global health. The report then focuses on the Caribbean region, with a view to understanding some of the vaccine diplomacy dynamics, notably in relation to the great powers and their combination of humanitarian and geopolitical motives. Cuba warrants—and receives—special attention as a small state that has been punching above its weight in the global vaccine diplomacy arena.

The global vaccination campaign and vaccine diplomacy discussed here fall under the rubric of health geopolitics. Unlike with conventional geopolitics, in health geopolitics nation-states are not the only consequential actors; the range of critical actors is expanded to include non-state actors, such as pharmaceutical companies and multilateral organizations, such as the WHO and PAHO. As Suerie Moon, Research Director and Co-Chair of the Forum on Global Governance for Health at the Harvard Global Health Institute, writes: “Europe, developing countries, the WHO, and the pharmaceutical industry are also key players in this complex, multilevel game. Normative authority, reputation, and scientific knowledge have become strategic sources of power” (2020).

The vaccination campaign is full of challenges, not just in scientific production, given the rapid emergence of COVID-19 variants, but also in terms of access, equity, and acceptance. The head of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) and Jamaica’s tourism minister are candid in highlighting elements of the complexities and some of the challenges in the epigraph. This report addresses these challenges, probing some of the institutional factors that militate against effective public health service delivery in general and vaccine delivery in particular, and the multifaceted problem of vaccine hesitancy. However, before we begin the vaccination factor journey, it is useful to remind ourselves of the nature of the region’s pandemic profile.

Read the full report

Click to access Vaccines-and-Vaccine-Diplomacy-in-the-Caribbean.pdf

Ivelaw Griffith is a Fellow with Global Americans and the Caribbean Policy Consortium who has published extensively on Caribbean security, drugs, and crime. His next book, Challenged Sovereignty, will be published by the University of Illinois Press.

Note from the author: I am grateful for the valuable comments on the first draft by Scott MacDonald, Francille Griffith, and Volderine Hackett.

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